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The Macroeconomics of Labor and Credit
Market Imperfections
By ETIENNE WASMER AND PHILIPPE WEIL*
Credit market imperfections inﬂuence the labor market and aggregate economic
activity. In turn, macroeconomic factors have an impact on the credit sector. To
assess these effects in a tractable general-equilibrium framework, we introduce
endogenous search frictions, in the spirit of Peter Diamond (1990), in both credit
and labor markets. We demonstrate that credit frictions amplify macroeconomic
volatility through a ﬁnancial accelerator. The magnitude of this general-equilibrium
accelerator is proportional to the credit gap, deﬁned as the deviation of actual
output from its perfect credit market level. We explore various extensions, notably
endogenous wages. (JEL J64, G24, E51)
Labor market frictions and wage rigidities are
not the only deviation from the Arrow-Debreu
paradigm. Modern economies are plagued with
a variety of informational imperfections in ﬁ-
nancial markets. These imperfections, which
may stem from moral hazard, adverse selection,
and search externalities, are relevant not only
for corporate ﬁnance—an area in which they
have extensively been studied—but also for
macroeconomics. This is, of course, the foun-
dation of the credit channel view of the trans-
mission of monetary policy: new businesses,
having poor access to credit markets, are the
primary victims of monetary contractions.
1
Beyond monetary issues, the ﬁnancial sector
plays a crucial role in the determination of eco-
nomic activity. On the one hand, ﬁnance con-
tributes, in a Schumpeterian view of growth, to
the development of new sectors and products.
Note, however, that the causality between ﬁ-
nance and macroeconomic activity might run in
reverse. For instance, Joan Robinson (1952, p.
86), cited by Ross Levine (1997), suggests that
“where enterprise leads, ﬁnance follows.”
2 On
the other hand, ﬁnancial intermediation gener-
ates macroeconomic volatility. In particular,
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) and
Bernanke et al. (1999) argue that a “ﬁnancial
accelerator” ampliﬁes macroeconomic ﬂuctua-
tions as the value of collateral varies over the
cycle.
The objective of this paper is to build a sim-
ple macroeconomic model of credit and labor
market imperfections which sheds light, in a
tractable way, on the interaction between mac-
roeconomic activity and ﬁnance, and to demon-
strate the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator
based on the general-equilibrium feedback be-
tween credit and labor markets. To that effect,
we develop a theory of job creation and job
destruction in an environment in which new
entrepreneurs have no wealth of their own, and
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1 See, for instance, Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler
(1989) and Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1994).
2 There have been several attempts to clarify empirically
the links between ﬁnance and growth. Robert G. King
and Levine (1993) examine cross-country evidence on the
role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in capital accumulation.
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998) argue that
causality goes both ways, but establish that the growth of
employment due to the number of establishments is twice as
large as the growth due to existing ﬁrms. This suggests that
ﬁnancial intermediaries indeed mitigate informational
asymmetries, and thus contribute to growth.
944must raise funds on imperfect credit market
before they enter the labor market to search for
workers.
To introduce credit market imperfections, we
use a modeling strategy that has proved tractable
and fruitful in thinking about the macroeconomics
of labor markets: search theory. We focus on the
credit and labor rationing that arises, when agents
are imperfectly aware of economic opportunities,
from the stochastic matching between creditors
and borrowers, and between workers and entre-
preneurs. Thus, we take a leaf from the macro-
labor literature, and follow, in the credit market,
the lead taken by Christopher A. Pissarides (2000)
in the labor market. Accordingly, we model cap-
ital market imperfections and labor market imper-
fections in a perfectly symmetric way, and
summarize at an abstract level the properties of the
credit and labor matching processes by a pair of
matching functions.
The beneﬁt of our symmetric, search-theoretical
formalization is that it eschews the microeco-
nomic detail associated, often at the cost of sub-
stantial complexity, with macroeconomic models
that introduce credit market imperfections through
moral hazard and/or adverse selection.
3
Several pieces of empirical evidence can be
adduced for our formalization of credit markets
imperfections. David G. Blanchﬂower and An-
drew J. Oswald (1998) report that raising capital
constitutes the principal difﬁculty encountered
by potential entrepreneurs. For instance, 20 per-
cent of the respondents of the 1987 U.K. Na-
tional Survey of the Self-Employed report that
where to get ﬁnance was the biggest obstacle to
self-employment.
4 On top of that, 51 percent of
the participants in the British Social Attitudes
Survey who say they failed to become self-
employed report, over the period 1983–1986,
that lack of capital or money was the main
culprit.
5 Since 40 to 60 percent of jobs are held
in small ﬁrms (less than 100 employees),
6
a theory of job creation and unemployment
must deal with difﬁculties in locating credit.
Furthermore, Mitchell A. Petersen and Rajan
(2002) document how “information closeness”
impinges on the efﬁciency of credit markets.
In addition, the survey of Levine (1997, p.
715) indicates that “the durability of the bank-
borrower relationship is valuable.” We take
this as evidence of match speciﬁcity which is
most simply modeled as the outcome of a
search-matching process. Finally, Giovanni
Dell’Ariccia and Pietro Garibaldi (2000) argue
that matching models of the capital market are a
promising way to rationalize the empirical evi-
dence on gross credit ﬂows.
Our symmetrical model of credit and labor
market imperfections is parsimonious, yet rich.
It enables us to show, in a framework reminis-
cent of IS/LM, that ﬁnancial imperfections in-
crease volatility, in the sense that they magnify
the response of the economy to exogenous
shocks. This ampliﬁcation mechanism is not
based, as it is in Bernanke et al. (1999) or
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), on ﬂuctuations in
the value of collateral, but instead on a general-
equilibrium interaction: the state of the credit
market affects the state of the labor market, but
the state of the labor market itself affects the
state of the credit market. We summarize this
interaction by providing a simple measure of the
ﬁnancial accelerator, which depends on the
credit gap, deﬁned as the percent deviation of
actual output from the level that would prevail
absent credit market imperfections.
Beyond our basic framework, we extend the
model to endogenous wages and to endogenous
destruction. In the former case, the equilibrium
outcome is crucially affected by the institutional
arrangement that govern bargaining between
ﬁnanciers, entrepreneurs, and workers—the
central organizational problem of capitalism.
We establish, for instance, that ﬁnanciers and
bankers have a common incentive to inﬂate the
ﬁrm’s debt beyond what is strictly necessary in
order to decrease the wage that will ultimately
be negotiated between entrepreneurs and work-
ers,
7 but that incentive compatibility consider-
ations limit the use of debt as a strategic
variable. In the latter extension, we establish that
endogenous job destruction generates ﬁnancial
3 See, for instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss
(1981) for microeconomic foundations, and Carl Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), or Philippe Aghion et al. (1999), for
macroeconomic applications.
4 Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), Table 8.
5 Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), Table 6.
6 These numbers are based on industry and market ser-
vices. See OECD (1994).
7 See Stephen G. Bronars and Donald R. Deere (1991)
and Enrico C. Perotti and Kathryn E. Spier (1993).
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al. (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section I
introduces the model. Section II presents the
model and derives the long-run equilibrium
with exogenous wages. Section III highlights
the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator. Section
IV extends the basic model by examining the
effects of endogenous wages, and of endoge-
nous destruction. The conclusion summarizes
and outlines directions for future research.
I. The Model
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the three
types of agents in our economy. We then char-
acterize optimal behavior during the four stages
of the life of a ﬁrm.
A. Entrepreneurs, Workers, and Financiers
There are three types of agents: entrepre-
neurs, workers, and ﬁnanciers. Entrepreneurs
have ideas but they cannot work in production,
and have no capital of their own. Workers,
who have neither entrepreneurial skills nor
capital, toil on the production line, and trans-
form the entrepreneurs’ ideas into output. Fi-
nally, ﬁnanciers have access to the ﬁnancial
resources required for the concretization of the
entrepreneurs’ ideas, but have no ideas and can-
not work on the production line.
8 In the real
world, there is a bit of the entrepreneur, the
worker, and the ﬁnancier in each agent, and
people can choose in which activity they want
to specialize. In our model, however, this is not
the case, and entrepreneurship, working, and
ﬁnancing are assigned, for simplicity, to mutu-
ally exclusive and exogenously assigned types
of agents.
Entrepreneurs and Workers.—Producing
output in a ﬁrm requires a team of one entre-
preneur and one worker. There are labor market
frictions, so that entrepreneurs and workers can-
not meet easily. An entrepreneur must search
for the worker that will enable him to carry out
his idea. We adopt the now standard device of
Pissarides (2000), and subsume the process of
matching workers to ﬁrms (which in principle
involves heterogeneity, together with informa-
tional difﬁculties) into a simple constant-returns-
to-scale technology h(, ) that “produces” a
ﬂow of matches between ﬁrms and workers
with two “inputs:” job vacancies  posted by
ﬁrms, and available (i.e., unemployed) workers
.
9 Measuring labor market tightness (from the
point of view of ﬁrms) by the index   /,
the instantaneous probability that an entrepre-
neur will ﬁnd a worker is thus
h, 
  h
1,1   q.
The tighter the labor market, the less probable it
is that an entrepreneur meets an available
worker (q()  0).
Financiers and Entrepreneurs.—Since an
entrepreneur must expend resources to search
for a worker before production even starts, the
entrepreneur must be able to ﬁnance his recruit-
ment efforts. Traditional models of the labor
market, such as Pissarides (2000), focus solely
on labor market frictions, and thus assume away
credit market frictions. As a result, entrepre-
neurs have no problem whatsoever ﬁnancing
their search for a worker, whether they ﬁnance
it on their own, or borrow the cost of posting
vacancies on a perfect capital market. But if
credit markets are imperfect, an entrepreneur
with an idea but without any capital will en-
counter some impediments when he turns to
credit markets to ﬁnd the funds required to post
a vacancy.
10
We could try, in line with the rest of the
8 We will hereafter interchangeably refer to ﬁnanciers or
bankers.
9 We impose, as usual, that marginal products in match-
ing are positive but decreasing: h1  0, h2  0, h11  0,
h22  0. Because of homogeneity, there is no scope for
on-the-job search.
10 This sequencing also captures the well-documented
fact that ﬁnanciers often play a crucial role in the compo-
sition of the management team of a ﬁrm, and that they thus
have an essential role to play in production. Studying the
reverse sequencing—labor search, then credit search—is
interesting only in cases where credit frictions are relatively
unimportant (e.g., the start-ups in the Silicon Valley where
skilled labor was much scarcer than venture capital). Ac-
cordingly, we focus exclusively in this paper on the “credit
search, then labor search” model.
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11 to describe in detail the microeco-
nomic nature of these credit market frictions.
Instead, we note that credit markets frictions do
not differ much from those encountered in labor
markets: moral hazard, heterogeneity, and spec-
iﬁcity are the hallmark of both credit and labor
markets imperfections. As a result, we chose to
describe credit market frictions symmetrically
to the way we model labor market frictions, and
introduce a credit market matching function.
12
Formally, let  be the number of bankers
looking for entrepreneurs, and denote by  the
number of entrepreneurs looking for ﬁnancing.
Each of these  entrepreneurs is searching for
one the  available bankers.
The ﬂow of loan contracts successfully
signed between ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs is
determined by the constant-returns-to-scale credit
market matching function m(, ).
13 From the
point of view of ﬁrms, credit market tightness
can be measured by   /. Equivalently,
1/ is an index (for ﬁrms) of the liquidity of the
credit market.
14
The instantaneous probability that an entre-




1,1   p,
which is decreasing in credit market tightness
(p()  0).
B. Four Stages in the Life of a Firm
The life of a ﬁrm can be decomposed into
four successive stages of stochastic length: fund
raising, recruitment, creation, and destruction.
● Fund-raising. In stage 0, prospective entre-
preneurs are looking, at a ﬂow search cost c,
for a bank willing, in exchange for future
repayments, to ﬁnance the posting of a job
vacancy. In line with the assumption that
entrepreneurs have no wealth, the cost c is
assumed to be nonpecuniary, e.g., a private
sweat cost reﬂecting the time it takes an en-
trepreneur to ﬁnd a ﬁnancier. At the same
time, ﬁnanciers are searching for clients at a
ﬂow search cost k. The probability of a
match, and of moving on to the recruitment
stage, is p().
● Recruitment. In stage 1, entrepreneurs have
found a ﬁnancier and are looking (at a ﬂow
search cost  borrowed from their ﬁnancier)
for the worker that will enable them to start
operating their ﬁrm. The probability that an
entrepreneur meets a worker, and that the
ﬁnancing stage ends, is q(). The repayment
 that the entrepreneur will make to the en-
trepreneur once the ﬁrm starts operating is
negotiated between the ﬁnancier and the
entrepreneur.
● Creation. In stage 2, the ﬁrm has found a
worker and is generating exogenous ﬂow out-
put y. It uses this output to pay its workers an
exogenous wage ,
15 and to pay back to its
ﬁnancier a ﬂow amount  as long as the
productive unit operates.
● Destruction. In the ﬁnal stage 3, the match
between ﬁrm and worker is destroyed. We
assume that destruction is exogenous—i.e.,
that the transition from stage 2 to 3 occurs
with a probability s.
16
Throughout, we assume that their are no com-
mitment problems for ﬁnanciers, ﬁrms, or
workers. All agents are risk neutral, with dis-
count rate r  0. Output, as well as wages and
11 See, for instance, Roger Farmer (1985) or Ricardo J.
Caballero and Mohamad Hammour (1998).
12 Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2000) and den Haan et al.
(2003) also represent credit market frictions using a match-
ing function, but they do not focus on the labor market. Den
Haan et al. (2003) investigate the average distance between
borrowers and lenders, and justify credit matching functions
by the relevance of geographical considerations in ﬁnancing
decisions. Finally, Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue empir-
ically that the IT revolution and the Internet have substan-
tially affected the geography of ﬁnancial relationships, a
fact which again is consistent with the existence a credit
market matching function.
13 We impose m1  0, m2  0, m11  0, m22  0.
14 Our concept of liquidity is the willingness of ﬁnan-
ciers to part from their resources to lend them to ﬁrms. It is
similar to the notion of liquidity used in stock markets.
There are of course other (more aquatic ...) meanings of
liquidity studied in the literature—such as the volume of
funds available for lending. For a leading analysis of liquid-
ity as the availability of ﬁnancial instruments able to trans-
fer wealth across periods, see Bengt Holmstrom and Jean
Tirole (1998).
15 We study in subsection A what happens when the
wage is instead negotiated between entrepreneurs and
workers.
16 We introduce endogenous destruction in sub-
section B.
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constant through time.
17
The Value of a Bank.—Call Bi, i  0, 1, 2,
3, the value of a bank in the fund-raising, re-
cruitment, creation, and destruction phases. Fo-
cusing for the moment on long-run equilibria
(we will discuss the short run below), the Bell-
man equations describing the evolution of the
steady-state values of the bank over these four
stages are:
(1) rB0  k  pB1  B0,
(2) rB1    qB2  B1,
(3) rB2    sB3  B2.
The ﬁnancier suffers a cash outﬂow k in the
fund-raising stage while it is looking for a cli-
ent. It pays out a ﬂow  in the recruitment stage,
while it ﬁnances the entrepreneur’s posting of a
job vacancy. Once the ﬁrm is created, the bank
enjoys a cash inﬂow  that corresponds to the
repayment by the ﬁrm of its debt. We assume,
for simplicity, that the destruction of the match
between ﬁrm and worker with probability s
entails a loss of the speciﬁcity of all matches, so
that B3  B0.
18
The Value of an Entrepreneur.—Let Ei,
i  0, 1, 2, 3, denote the steady-state value of an
entrepreneurial unit in the fund-raising, recruit-
ment, creation, and destruction phases. It
evolves as follows:
(4) rE0  c  pE1  E0,
(5) rE1  qE2  E1,
(6) rE2  y      sE3  E2.
The entrepreneur expends a ﬂow sweat cost c in
the ﬁrst stage, nothing during the recruitment
phase (the cost of posting a job vacancy is borne
by the ﬁnancier), and receives a cash ﬂow y 
   in the operating stage (output net of wage
and ﬁnancial costs). We again assume that de-
struction with probability s of the match be-
tween ﬁrm and worker destroys all speciﬁcity,
so that E3  E0.
19
C. Bargaining Between the Financier and the
Entrepreneur
The contract between ﬁnancier and entrepre-
neur is negotiated when they meet. The terms of
the contract are (i) that the bank will ﬁnance the
recruitment cost of the entrepreneur ( per unit
of time) for as long as it takes to ﬁnd a worker,
and that, in exchange, (ii) the entrepreneur will
repay the ﬁnancier a constant amount  per unit
of time as long as the ﬁrm operates.
20 Note that
we refer to this ﬁnancial contract as a “loan”
although it has equity-like aspects. The return to
the ﬁnancier depends on how quickly the ﬁrm
ﬁnds a worker and on how long the ﬁrm will
operate.
Financier and entrepreneur share the surplus
of their relationship according to a generalized
Nash bargaining rule
  arg maxB1  B0
	E1  E0
1	,
where 	  (0, 1) measures the bargaining
power of bankers in the credit relationship.
21 It
follows that the stipulated loan repayment 
must satisfy
(7) 	E1  E0  1  	B1  B0.
17 Were output and wages to grow exogenously at a
common rate, search costs (which represent the opportunity
cost of time) would have to grow at the same rate. It is thus
straightforward to extend our model to allow for balanced
growth.
18 An alternative formulation would impose B3  B1,s o
that the value of the bank remains positive after the disso-
lution of the match between ﬁrm and worker. This would
substantially complicate the model without affecting its
main insights. This is similar to what happens in labor
matching models when, in spite of free entry, the value of
ﬁrms remains positive after the destruction of the match
when there is, say, a ﬁxed capital stock.
19 This assumption is symmetrical to the condition B3 
B0 we imposed above, and is subject, mutatis mutandis, to
the caveat of footnote 18.
20 An alternative to this loan contract would be a loan
schedule that would make repayment to the ﬁnancier con-
tingent on accumulated debt and on the time it took the
entrepreneur to ﬁnd a worker. This alternative contract
would force us to introduce ex post heterogeneity between
entrepreneurs—which we want to avoid.
21 In a Rubinstein game of alternating offers and coun-
teroffers, the parameter 	 reﬂects the relative impatience of
the negotiating parties.
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Assume it is costless to set up a bank or a ﬁrm
in stage 0. Free entry of ﬁnanciers and entre-
preneurs on the credit and labor market then
ensures that, in equilibrium:
22
(8) B0  0 and E0  0.
A. Equilibrium Credit Market Tightness
From the fund-raising stage value functions
(1) and (4), it follows from reading period 0








In a less liquid credit market (higher ), the
equilibrium value of a (matched) ﬁnancier is
lower, while the value of a (matched) ﬁrm is
higher—as ﬁnanciers have to search less and
ﬁrms more when there are more ﬁrms relative to
banks.
Since the surplus of the banking relationship
is split between ﬁnancier and entrepreneur ac-
cording to the sharing rule (7), we immediately
have:
PROPOSITION 1: In equilibrium, the tight-







Substitute (9) and (10) into (7).
The lower the ﬂow cost k for ﬁnanciers look-
ing for a suitable lender, and the higher the ﬂow
cost c for entrepreneurs searching for a banker,
the lower * (i.e., the higher the number of
available ﬁnanciers relative to the number of
entrepreneurs raising funds). Moreover, the less
proﬁtable the sharing of the surplus of the credit
relationship is to the bank (low 	), the tighter
the credit market (higher *). Remarkably, *,
and hence the equilibrium value of the ﬁnancier
and of the entrepreneur, is constant in equilib-
rium, and depends only on technological (c and
k) and institutional (	) features of the credit
market. This feature, which is built by design
into the model by our assumptions, allows for a
convenient recursive solution.
B. Equilibrium Financial Contract
Banker and entrepreneur split the expected
present discounted value of output, net of
wages, that the ﬁrm will generate once it starts
operating. The stronger the bargaining power of
the bank relative to the ﬁrm, the larger the
equilibrium repayment of the ﬁrm to the ﬁnan-
cier in the production stage:
PROPOSITION 2: In equilibrium, the repay-
ment ﬂow from entrepreneur to ﬁnancier is
  	y    1  	r  s/q.
PROOF:
The proof is by forward substitution of the
Bellman equations. From equations (9) and
(10), the Bellman equations in the recruitment
stage, (2) and (5), imply that, in equilibrium,
(11) B1 
  qB2




r  q .
Similarly, the “exit” equations B3  B0  0




r  s ,
and, from equations (5) and (6), that
22 These free-entry conditions are very convenient to
obtain closed-form solutions. They are not necessarily real-
istic and may not hold if entry is associated to a ﬁxed cost,
or if agents are heterogenous. In either case, the simplicity
of the solutions we exhibit here would be lost.
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y    
r  s .
By forward substitution of (13) into (11), and
of (14) into (12), we ﬁnd, using the (equilib-
rium) Nash bargaining condition 	E1  (1 
	)B1, that the value of  must be the one
given in the proposition.
Once multiplied by the discount factor
q/[(r  q)(r  s)], the equilibrium Nash bar-
gaining loan contract described in Proposition 2
can be interpreted as stipulating that the ex-
pected present discounted value of repay-
ments from the entrepreneur to the ﬁnancier
is a weighted average of the expected present
discounted value of the ﬁrm’s output net of
wages, and of the expected present discounted
value of the loan made by the ﬁnancier to the
entrepreneur, with weights given by the re-
spective bargaining power of ﬁnancier and
entrepreneur.
The stronger the bargaining power of the
ﬁnancier in the credit contract negotiation (i.e.,
the larger 	), the larger the share of the ex-
pected present discounted value of output net of
wages that he can extract from the entrepreneur,
and the further away the value of the ﬁrm’s
repayment from the expected present dis-
counted value of what it has borrowed. Finally,
note that, since q()  0, the entrepreneur on
average repays more when labor markets are
tight—for it takes on average longer for the ﬁrm
to ﬁnd a worker in a tight labor market.
Should we conclude from Proposition 2 that
our model predicts that the equilibrium loan
contract depends on the state of the labor market
 but not on the tightness of the credit market?
No, because, as we shall now see, equilibrium 
itself depends on *.
C. Equilibrium Labor Market Tightness
In a free-entry equilibrium, the expected
search costs that ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs
incur by entering the credit market must equal
the expected beneﬁts that they will eventually
derive from forming a ﬁnancial relationship.
Therefore:
PROPOSITION 3: Equilibrium credit market
tightness *  [(1  	)/	](k/c) and labor mar-























Equations (9) and (10) provide us with back-
ward-looking expressions for B1 and E1 that
depend solely on : it is these expressions that
we read on the left-hand side of equations (15)
and (16). Now, forward substitutions of equa-
tion (13) into (11), and of equation (14) into
(12) give us two alternative formulas B1 and E1
that depend on the endogenous parameters 
and . Substituting  out of these formulas using
Proposition 2, we get alternative expressions for
B1 and E1 that depend only on :w eﬁnd these
expressions on the right-hand side of equations
(15) and (16). Equilibrium requires that the
backward and forward expressions for B1 and
E1 coincide—whence Proposition 3.
To understand this proposition, note that the
total surplus value of a job vacancy (to both the
banker and the entrepreneur) is expected present







r  s 

q.
Using equations (9) and (10), the equilibrium condi-
tions (15) and (16) are just another way of writing
B1  	V() and E1  (1  	)V() or that, as
described, the surplus V() is split in proportions
	 and 1  	 between banker and entrepreneur.
As depicted in Figure 1, equation (15) deﬁnes
an upward-sloping iso-value (B0  0) locus BB
in (, ) space with a vertical asymptote at  
deﬁned as the unique solution to the equation
V()  0. If the expected cost of entry for a
bank is higher because the credit market is
looser (i.e., there are many ﬁnanciers chasing
few entrepreneurs), zero proﬁts can only be
23 See Pissarides (2000).
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(i.e., more vacancies relative to unemploy-
ment), which shortens the expected duration of
the recruiting stage. Similarly, equation (16)
deﬁnes a downward-sloping iso-value (E0  0)
locus EE in (, ) space, depicting the trade-off
for the entering ﬁrm between a tighter credit
market (which raises the expected cost of
searching for a bank) and a looser labor market
(which lowers the expected cost of ﬁnding a
worker). Consistent with Proposition 2, the BB
and EE loci intersect at *  [(1  	)/	]/[k/c].
Moreover, Figure 1 shows that existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium are easy to guarantee.
24
As credit markets become more efﬁcient in
matching borrowers and lenders [this can be
modeled as an increase in the matching proba-
bility p() at all levels of ], the BB curve
shifts down and to the right. As a result, *
rises, but equilibrium * remains unchanged as
long as c and k remain unchanged and positive.
Figure 2, which illustrates these features, there-
fore suggests that policies that shift the EE
curve to the right are more effective in raising
* the stronger credit frictions are. We elaborate
on this remark in the next section.
In the limit, as credit matching becomes in-
stantaneous [p()  	for all ], equilibrium
labor market tightness tends to  , so that V( ) 
0. This is nothing but the Pissarides (2000)
free-entry condition for ﬁrms in the absence of
credit frictions. Our framework thus nests the
Pissarides equilibrium without credit market
frictions. How does * compare with  ? The
answer is provided by inspection of Figure 1, or
more formally by:
COROLLARY 1: Credit market imperfections
lower equilibrium labor market tightness: *   .
PROOF:
From either equation (15) or (16), and using
Proposition 1, equilibrium labor market tight-
ness satisﬁes











Since q  0, it follows that *   .
These results about equilibrium labor market
tightness translate directly into statements about
equilibrium unemployment and gross output,
since unemployment declines and gross output
rises when  rises.
25 The EE/BB curves drawn
in Figure 1 are thus reminiscent of IS/LM, al-
though they rest on very different theoretical
foundations: on the horizontal axis, gross output
rises with , while on the vertical axis  is a
measure of the tightness of credit markets.
24 Let B be such that k/[Bp(B)] 	(y)/(rs), and
E be such that c/[p(E)]  (1  	)(y  )/(r  s). Figure
1 shows that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium is BE. We assume that this
restriction on the parameters of the model is satisﬁed.
25 See subsection D for a proof.
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that the result that credit frictions raise equilib-
rium unemployment relative to the Pissarides
model is not surprising, and that all we have
done is to prove that credit frictions shift the
labor demand curve to the left, resulting in
more equilibrium unemployment. But the
mechanism at work in our model is much richer
and subtler. Credit market frictions reduce
the number of ﬁnanciers. This discourages en-
try by ﬁrms, who ﬁnd it harder to ﬁnance
themselves. The reduced number of ﬁrms in
turn discourages ﬁnanciers from entering the
credit market, as it is more difﬁcult for banks
to ﬁnd an entrepreneur. This discourages entry
by ﬁrms, which discourages entry by ﬁnan-
ciers, and so on. Hence, rather than an inward
shift in the labor demand curve, what is really
at work here is a ﬁnancial accelerator stem-
ming from general-equilibrium effects. As in
Bernanke et al. (1999), credit markets frictions
“amplify and propagate shocks to the macro-
economy.” To be sure, the nature of the am-
pliﬁcation mechanism in our double search
model is different from the collateral/net worth
effects at the heart of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) or Bernanke et al. (1999). Ours is based
on the general-equilibrium interaction between
credit and labor markets, while theirs rests
on the equilibrium link between current and
future credit markets. But both mechanisms
point out that a general-equilibrium analysis
of the impact of credit frictions, rather than
the study of shifts in the labor demand curve,
is required to assess the effectiveness of eco-
nomic policy. We return to this theme in
Section III.
D. A Beveridge Curve Representation
To characterize the effects of credit market
imperfections on job vacancies and unemploy-
ment, we can represent equilibrium as the inter-
section of the Beveridge curve and of the ray
representing equilibrium labor market tightness
in the (, ) plane.
Let u denote the unemployment rate.
Normalize the mass of workers to 1, so that
u  . In steady state, ﬂows in and out of
the unemployment pool must equilibrate, so
that
(19) s1  u  qu.
As a result, u is decreasing in , and so is gross
output (1  u)y. Since   /u, the equation of
the Beveridge curve is u  s/[s  (/u)q(/u)],
which can be shown, given our assumptions, to
be decreasing and convex. Now, we know that
in the equilibrium with credit market imperfec-
tions   *u while    u in the Pissarides
equilibrium without credit frictions. Equilib-
rium job vacancies and unemployment with and
without credit frictions are thus determined in
Figure 3 by the intersections W and P of the
Beveridge curve with these two rays from the
origin.
III. A Financial Accelerator
We have suggested above that credit market
frictions amplify shocks in the economy. We
now document in two ways the existence in our
model of a ﬁnancial accelerator. First, we return
to the long-run equilibrium described in the
previous section and describe, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, how this accelerator oper-
ates. Second, we establish that macroeconomic
volatility is ampliﬁed even further in the short
run (i.e., before entry by banks takes place) by
credit market frictions.
A. The Long Run
We ﬁrst show that the amplitude of the re-
sponse of shocks to search costs and proﬁts is
FIGURE 3. BEVERIDGE CURVE
Notes: P  Pissarides equilibrium; W  equilibrium with
credit market imperfections.
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frictions. We will exhibit this long-run ﬁnancial
accelerator graphically, and then quantify its
magnitude.
Qualitative Comparative Statics.—Let us
look ﬁrst at the effect on equilibrium of higher
search costs for banks, of lower search costs for
ﬁrms, and of improved ﬁrms’ net output.
Higher Search Costs for Banks.—What hap-
pens if the banks’ search cost k rises? Inspection
of equations (15) and (16) reveals that the BB
curve shifts up and to the left (for any given
level , a higher k induces exit by ﬁnanciers and
raises ), while the EE curve stays put (ﬁrms
entry decisions are not directly affected by k).
As a result, the credit market tightens and the
labor market slackens. The economic mecha-
nism underlying this result is the following:
higher search costs make some ﬁnanciers exit
the credit market. This induces some ﬁrms to
exit, which lowers  and mitigates the tighten-
ing of the credit market—through a move along
the EE curve. If we think of higher search costs
for banks as being induced by tighter monetary
policy or more restrictive credit conditions,
these comparative statics are quite similar qual-
itatively to that associated with contractionary
monetary policy in the IS/LM model.
Lower Credit Search Costs for Entrepre-
neurs.—What happens if the ﬁrm’s fund-raising
cost goes down? Lower credit search cost c for
ﬁrms induces entry of new entrepreneurs at any
given level of credit market tightness: the EE
curves shifts out and to the right. The banks’
entry decisions are not directly affected by c,s o
that BB does not move.
In equilibrium, entry of new ﬁrms tightens
both the credit and labor markets (a move along
the BB curve), but the tightening of the credit
market is mitigated by the entry of new ﬁnan-
ciers trying to take advantage of the increase in
the number of entrepreneurs looking for credit.
Improvement in the Firm’s Proﬁts.—Imagine
output net of wages y   increases. This
improved proﬁtability directly affects the entry
decisions of both ﬁrms and ﬁnanciers by raising
the size of the surplus that entering banks and
ﬁrms will eventually split. As a result, for any
given credit tightness , more ﬁrms are willing
to search when y   is higher, so that the EE
curve shifts out and to the right. At the same
time, for any given labor market tightness, more
ﬁnanciers are willing to search when y   is
high, so that the BB curve shifts down and to
the right. Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium:
credit market tightness is ultimately un-
changed,
26 but the labor market tightens and
unemployment declines.
Examination of Figure 2 shows that the effect
of these cost or proﬁt shocks on  is ampliﬁed
by credit market frictions as we move away
from the Pissarides equilibrium. The magnitude
of the ﬁnancial accelerator thus depends on the
strength of credit market frictions.
Measuring the Financial Accelerator.—To
get a quantitative feeling for the size of the
effects we have been discussing, we now log-
linearize the main equations of the model around
equilibrium. We proceed under the simplifying




  y  /r  s  y  /s
the expected present discount value of output net
of wages at the time the ﬁrm meets its worker.
Denote by x ˆ the proportional deviation of a vari-
able x from its equilibrium value x*, i.e., x ˆ 
(xx*)/x*. Call and the elasticities of the credit
and labor matching functions at equilibrium:
26 This is a result of Proposition 1.
27 The generalization to the case r  0 is uninstructive.
FIGURE 4. INCREASE IN NET OUTPUT y  
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q**
q* ,   
p**
p* .
Under the assumptions we have made on the
matching functions,   (0, 1) and   (0, 1).
Elementary algebraic manipulations of equation
(15), using Proposition 1,28 tell us how equilib-
rium labor market tightness responds to changes
in c, k, , and 
 when r  0:













 1  0
is a measure of credit market tightness—i.e., a
measure of the departure of equilibrium labor
market tension from the Pissarides model. The
coefﬁcient  ranges from 0 when *    (no
credit frictions) to 	 when credit frictions go
to inﬁnity and * goes to zero. We conclude
that:
● The elasticity of equilibrium labor market
tightness with respect to the present dis-
counted value of net output is (1  )/  1.
Credit market frictions thus amplify by a fac-
tor 1   the effect of changes in proﬁts on
labor market tightness relative to the Pissar-
ides case (  0). The coefﬁcient  is thus a
measure of the ﬁnancial accelerator.
● The elasticity of * with respect to the search
cost of banks k is /, while its elasticity
with respect to the credit search cost of ﬁrms
is (1  )/. Both elasticities are nega-
tive: credit frictions slacken the labor market.
These elasticities are larger in absolute value
the tighter the credit market.
● The elasticity of * with respect to the labor
search cost  is exactly the same, 1/,a si n
the Pissarides model.
Unemployment.—Using equation (19), the
unemployment rate and employment rate e 
1  u respond to changes in  according to:
(22) u ˆ  1  u*1   ˆ,
(23) e ˆ  1  e*1   ˆ.
As in the Pissarides model, the proportional
effect of labor market tightness on the (un)em-
ployment rate thus depends on the level of em-
ployment—ar e ﬂection of the convexity of the
Beveridge curve. A similar result of course
holds for gross output per head, which is pro-
portional to 1  u.
Now note that, for   close to *, a ﬁrst-order
Taylor expansion of equation (21) around *
yields    ˆ*. Combining this approximation
with equation (23) hence provides us with a way
to quickly gauge empirically the magnitude of






1  e* e ˆ.
Now e ˆ is the percentage decline in the equilib-
rium employment rate (equivalently, in gross
output per head) that is due to credit frictions.
Call it the credit gap. For moderate credit fric-
tions, the ﬁnancial accelerator is thus propor-
tional to the credit gap. The coefﬁcient of
proportionality equals 10, for instance, if the
elasticity of the labor matching function is  
0.5, and the employment rate is 90 percent. As
a result, if the credit gap is 7 percent, the ﬁnan-
cial accelerator  equals 70 percent, implying
that the ﬁnancial accelerator ampliﬁes, say, the
elasticity of equilibrium labor market tension
with respect to proﬁt shocks by 70 percent rel-
ative to the Pissarides equilibrium.
29
Excess Return.—Finally, deﬁne the internal
rate of return of loans to ﬁrms, as the interest
rate R that equalizes the expected present dis-
counted value of the loan /[R  q(*)] and the
expected present discounted repayment on the
28 Alternatively, we could use both (15) and (16).
29 Formula (24) relates two obviously endogenous vari-
ables, and is only provided for back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lations. A proper equilibrium computation is performed in
the next subsection.
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Proposition 2, we ﬁnd that
(25) R  r  	r  s.
The excess return R  r on business loans is
increasing in 	 (the share of the bank) and in 
(credit market imperfections). Credit market
imperfections affect the excess return on com-
mercial paper by increasing the duration of the
(costly) ﬁrst stage, and by increasing the cost of
credit (and therefore ). Furthermore, an in-
crease in the destruction probability s increases
R by decreasing the expected length of the re-
payment period.
Numerical Evaluation.—To get a feel for the
equilibrium levels predicted by our model, we






where q0 and p0 are (scale) measures of the
intensity of the matches in labor and credit
markets.
Table 1 reports equilibrium unemployment
rates in four different cases that correspond to
possible combinations of “high” and “low”
credit and labor market frictions.
30 Traditional
explanations (based solely on labor market im-
perfections) must rely on a high degree of mis-
match on the labor market, as measured by q0,
to explain high unemployment: they are cap-
tured by the southwestern cell of Table 1. The
northeastern cell of Table 1 suggests an alter-
native perspective: high unemployment might
result from the combination of moderate labor
and moderate credit frictions.
This exercise conﬁrms the macroeconomic
relevance of intermediation or ﬁnancial costs,
already documented by Pierfederico Asdrubali
et al. (1996), and suggests that credit costs are a
good way to improve the calibration of the
matching model.
31
Consistent with our earlier back-of-the-
envelope computations based on equation (24),
the ﬁnancial accelerator  equals 0.74, so that
the elasticities of tightness to proﬁts 
, search
costs c or k, and  are respectively, using (20),
3.4, 1.74, and 2. The internal rate of return
on loans to the ﬁrms is 22.4 percent a year, i.e.,
an excess return of 17.4 percent over the risk-
less rate r  5 percent. In other terms, the
internal rate of return on loans is 17.4 percent
higher than it would be absent credit market
imperfections—which we view again as an im-
provement over standard calibrations.
B. The Short Run: Overshooting
We have so far only discussed equilibria in
which free entry of banks or ﬁrms drives down
to zero the value of yet inactive ﬁnanciers or
entrepreneurs. In these equilibria, which can be
viewed as describing long-run outcomes, ﬁ-
nancial liberalization, modeled as a policy that
lowers the search cost k of banks, always
has unambiguous expansionary effects: lower
search costs for banks attract more ﬁnanciers
into credit; this attracts more entrepreneurs,
which reduces equilibrium unemployment.
What if, by contrast, we lived in a short run in
which the total number of banks were ﬁxed and
did not respond to improved proﬁt incentives? If
the free entry of banks that is at the heart of the
expansionary long-run effects of a lower k is
blocked, lowering k simply increases the value
of existing banks B0, instead of attracting more
30 We assume 	  0.5 and c  k  0.35, so that * 
1. Furthermore, we specify   1.5, y  1, s  0.15, r 
0.05,     0.5, and   0.66.
31 See Monika Merz (1995), and Harold L. Cole and
Richard Rogerson (1999) for more on calibration issues. For
the parameters of the northeastern cell of the table, it takes
about one year to ﬁnd a credit line, and eight months to
recruit a worker. Total pecuniary credit costs, excluding the
sweat cost for the entrepreneur of ﬁnding a ﬁnancier, rep-
resent 7 percent of total discounted output y/(r  s). Equiv-




u (percent) p0  	 p0  1
Labor
q0  1.5 5.6 9.3
q0  1.1 9.9 16.0
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existing banks in their negotiation with ﬁrms (as
entrepreneurs are now facing a given number of
banks that have more favorable outside op-
tions). As a result, the equilibrium repayment
from ﬁrms to banks rises when k falls. This
deterioration of the ﬁrms’ﬁ nancial condition
leads some entrepreneurs to leave the credit
market. This in turn must result in higher un-
employment in the short run.
It is easy to conﬁrm formally that, as a result
of ﬁnancial liberalization, the unemployment
rate overshoots its long-run value: a lower k ﬁrst
raises, but then eventually lowers equilibrium
unemployment.
32 This rationalizes the belief
that ﬁnancial liberalization might generate
short-run volatility, and reinforces the message
that an understanding of the effects of ﬁnancial
imperfections requires going beyond demand
and supply. The mechanism at play is straight-
forward, and it is at the heart of the economics
of imperfect markets: reducing the incumbents’
costs when, in the short run, all barriers to entry
have not yet been removed, only increases the
incumbents’ rents. Consequently, ﬁnancial re-
form raises short-run unemployment when there
are still obstacles to entry in the banking sector.
IV. Extensions
We now demonstrate, by exploring possible
extensions and applications, that our basic
framework is well-suited to study two macro-
economic questions at the junction of labor and
ﬁnancial economics. What are the effects of
ﬁnancial imperfections on bargained wages and
on the incentives of entrepreneurs to recruit
suitable workers? What happens when a ﬁrm
experiences episodes of negative cash ﬂows?
A. Endogenous Wage
We have assumed up to now that the wage
paid to workers was exogenous. We now exam-
ine what happens when, more generally and
perhaps more realistically, the wage is negoti-
ated between workers and entrepreneurs.
Endogenous wages gives rise to “me ´nage a `
trois” between workers, entrepreneurs, and
bankers. How the ﬁnal output of the ﬁrm is split
between its three partners, and which institu-
tional arrangements are put in place to organize
their conﬂicting interests, is the central problem
of capitalist economies. Our model provides a
simple framework in which to think about the
macroeconomicimpactofvariousarrangements—
a theme often associated with Marxian economics.
We show that the fact that entrepreneurs and
bankers meet before entrepreneurs and workers
does affect ﬁnancial and wage bargaining. The
parties who bargain ﬁrst (the ﬁnancier and the
entrepreneur) anticipate in their ﬁnancial deal-
ings the later arrival of workers in the ﬁrm. Debt
thus becomes a strategic instrument that ﬁnan-
ciers and entrepreneurs can use to reduce the
wage that workers will eventually negotiate
with their employer.
33 However, we argue that
incentive compatibility considerations limit, in
practice, the use of debt as a strategic variable.
34
Sequential Bargaining.—There are now two
types of contracts in our economy: loan contracts
negotiated between ﬁnanciers and entrepre-
neurs, and wage contracts bargained between
entrepreneurs and workers. Consistent with the
necessity for an entrepreneur to ﬁnd a banker
before she can look for a worker, these contracts
are negotiated sequentially. The loan contract is
struck in stage 1, when ﬁnancier and entrepre-
neur meet. The wage contract is then negotiated
in stage 2 when entrepreneur and worker ﬁnd
each other.
Entrepreneurs and workers take as given the
loan contract which was written before they
met. Bankers and entrepreneurs know that the
result of their ﬁnancial bargaining will inﬂuence
the terms of the eventual labor contract.
32 As long as there is free entry in the entrepreneurial
sector, there is of course no such contrast between long-run
and short-run effects of decreasing the search cost c of
entrepreneurs.
33 The use of debt as a device to decrease the share of
workers has been studied empirically and formalized theo-
retically by Bronars and Deere (1991) and Perotti and Spier
(1993). The existence of this problem is recognized by
Caballero and Hammour (1998) but assumed away by the
assumption of block bargaining (workers against bankers
and entrepreneurs).
34 Another limit, which we do not explore here because
it would take us too far into contract theory, is the possi-
bility that workers might refuse to work in a highly levered
ﬁrm paying too low wages. This might induce the ﬁrm’s
bankers to accept ex post a debt reduction. The anticipation
of this renegotiation might constrain ex ante the use of debt
as a strategic variable.
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and start with a description of wage bargain-
ing between entrepreneur and worker, given
the terms of the ﬁnancial contract  struck
earlier between the entrepreneur and his
ﬁnancier.
Let W denote the value for a worker of being
employed, U the value of being unemployed,
and b unemployment beneﬁts. Then W and
U satisfy the following steady-state Bellman
equations:
(26) rW    sU  W,
(27) rU  b  qW  U,
since q() is the probability that an unem-
ployed worker will get out of the unemploy-
ment pool by ﬁnding a job. Assume that
entrepreneur and worker share the surplus
(E2  E0)  (W  U) generated by their rela-
tionship according a general Nash bargaining
rule.
35 Then
  arg maxE2  E0
1W  U
,
where   (0, 1) measures the bargaining
power of workers in the labor relationship. This
enables us to establish:
PROPOSITION 4: The wage schedule in any
individual ﬁrm is given by
  y    1  rU.
PROOF:
Using the free-entry condition E0  0, the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal surplus sharing
is E2  (1  )(W  U). Substituting equa-
tions (6), (26), and (27) into this ﬁrst-order con-
dition yields the expression in the proposition.
The larger the ﬁrm’s output net of repayment
to the ﬁnancier, the larger the wage. The more
pleasant the prospect of unemployment looks to
the worker (i.e., the larger U), the larger the
wage must be. If workers have all the bargain-
ing power (  1), they extract all the surplus
of the relationship by claiming what is left of
output once the ﬁnancier has been repaid ( 
y  ). If workers have no bargaining power, they
are just paid the annuity value of the utility they
would get if they were unemployed (  rU).
We will need below the following character-
ization of the effect of the repayment  on the
wage contract in the ﬁrm:
COROLLARY 2: A unit increase in repay-
ments to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancier decreases the wage
by  (i.e., /  ).
The more the entrepreneur has promised to
repay its ﬁnancier, the smaller the total surplus
that remains available to the ﬁrm and its worker.
Since the workers get all the surplus when they
have all the bargaining power (  1), it is in
such a case that an increased repayment to the
banker affects them most.
We obtain an alternative characterization of
the optimal wage contract by using equations
(26) and (27) to compute U in Proposition 4.
This yields:
COROLLARY 3: The optimal wage contract is:
(28)   y    1  b,
where   [r  s  q()]/[r  s 
q()].
The weight  increases from  to 1 when 
rises from 0 to 	: increased labor market tight-
ness improves the workers’ outside options, and
raises their share  of output net of repayment
to the ﬁnancier. In the limit, when   	 , the
workers’ outside option is the same as their
current net value, and they capture all the sur-
plus (  1).
Loan Bargaining.—Since the loan contract
between ﬁnancier and entrepreneur is written
before the entrepreneur meets his worker,
35 As in the exogenous wage section (see footnote 18),
we make the assumption that the relation between banker
and entrepreneur is destroyed in case of a separation
between entrepreneur and worker. Alternative speciﬁca-
tions are possible (e.g., an outside option of E1 instead of
E0), but they have the unappealing feature that the bank
would continue to ﬁnance the ﬁrm’s job search beyond a
breakdown of the wage negotiation. It is thus in the
interest of the bank to commit ex ante to dissolve its
relationship with the ﬁrm should the latter fail to hire a
worker after a match—whence our assumption that the
fallback option of the ﬁrm is E0. In any case, both
assumptions (E0 or E1) lead to similar qualitative results.
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effect of the bargain they strike now on the later
negotiation between entrepreneur and worker.
While it is still true that   arg max(B1 
B0)
	(E1  E0)
1	, the outcome of bargaining is
now given by
PROPOSITION 5: The ﬁnancial contract be-
tween ﬁnancier and entrepreneur is
(29)   	y    1  	r  s/q,
where 	  	/[1  (1  	)]  	.
PROOF:
Using Corollary 2 to track the effect of  on
the ﬁrm’s future wage, the ﬁrst-order condition
for optimal sharing of the surplus is, using the
exit conditions B0  E0  0:
(30) 1  	B1  	E1.
The expression in the proposition follows
immediately, using equations (2), (3), (5),
and (6).
The equilibrium Nash-bargaining loan con-
tract is formally similar to the one described by
Proposition 5 in the exogenous wage case.
However, it is now the higher effective bargain-
ing power 	 of the banker that matters for the
equilibrium outcome. For instance, when  
	  0.5, 	 equals 2/3, which represents a
nonnegligible increase in the effective bargain-
ing power of ﬁnanciers.
Equilibrium.—Since sequential ﬁnancial and
wage bargaining effectively reinforces the hand
of the banker in ﬁnancial negotiations, we
should expect the credit market to be less tight
in the equilibrium with endogenous wages. In-
deed, we have:
PROPOSITION 6: When wages are endoge-
nous, equilibrium credit market tightness is











By straightforward analogy with the proof of
Proposition 1.
Equilibrium credit market tightness is de-
noted *  to emphasize its dependence, in the
endogenous wage case, on the parameter  that
governs the sharing of the surplus between en-
trepreneurs and workers.
For any , the credit market is less tight when
the wage is endogenous than when it is exoge-
nous. A higher  has two effects. First, a size-
of-the-cake effect. When workers have more
bargaining power, there is less remaining sur-
plus to be shared by bankers and entrepreneurs.
However, as in the case of exogenous wages,
size-of-the-cake effects, which affect entry mar-
gins for ﬁnanciers and entrepreneurs equally,
are irrelevant for the determination of equilib-
rium credit market tightness. Second, a distrib-
utive effect that tilts the allocation of output, net
of wages, in favor of bankers to the detriment of
entrepreneurs (see Proposition 5). Proposition 6
shows that only the latter effect matters for
equilibrium credit market tightness. Indeed, if 
were equal to zero, we would have 	  	 and
*   * as the distributive effect would then
disappear.
We now compute the equilibrium labor mar-
ket tightness * :
PROPOSITION 7: Equilibrium labor market
tightness *  and credit market tightness *  
[(1  	)/	][k/c] are the solution to the pair of
equations:
k














r  s 

q.
with   [(1  	)]/[1  	].
PROOF:
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
Using this proposition, equilibrium wage and
ﬁnancial contracts can in turn be computed from
Corollary 3 and Proposition 5.
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far assumed that entrepreneurs borrow exactly 
per unit of time, and repay the corresponding .
However, since increasing the value of  is a
way to decrease the share of workers in the
wage bargaining problem, it is in the interest of
both bankers and ﬁrms to use debt as a strategic
variable to expropriate workers, and to stipulate
a ﬂow loan larger than  and, accordingly, a
repayment larger than the  we have computed
above. It is therefore natural to wonder whether
the cash ﬂow from ﬁnancier to entrepreneur
might rise, beyond , up to the point where
wages have been reduced to their reservation
level b.
36 We now show, by contradiction, that
this is ruled out if we introduce incentive com-
patibility considerations.
Suppose that the debt of the ﬁrm is so high
that the negotiated wage rate equals its reserva-
tion level:   b. From Corollary 3, this can
only occur, since     0, if y    b. But
then equation (14) implies the value of the ﬁrm
in stage 2 is zero:
E2 
y    
r  s  0,
as the wage bargained between ﬁrms and work-
ers is indeed reduced to its reservation level b
only if the surplus shared in stage 2 is zero.
Financier and entrepreneur can achieve this re-
duction by raising the payment the entrepreneur
receives from the ﬁnanciers above the search
cost , so that output net of repayment to the
ﬁnancier, y  , equals b.
Notice, however, the value of the ﬁrm in
stage 1 is strictly positive as, by equation (10),
(32) E1 
c
p*   0.
We therefore conclude that E2  E1  0i ft h e
ﬁnancier and the entrepreneur use debt strategi-
cally to bring down the wage to zero: the ﬁrm
suffers a capital loss when moving from stage 1
to stage 2.
While we have assumed so far full commit-
ment of all agents, we should however not for-
get that debt usually has disincentive effects that
must be taken into consideration as soon as one
starts analyzing strategic behavior. In that re-
spect, a situation in which E2  E1  0 provides
no incentive to the entrepreneur to ever actually
hire a worker. In other words, if debt is so high
that it reduces E2 to zero, the entrepreneur pre-
fers to remain in stage 1, and to forever pocket
the positive difference between what the entre-
preneur lends her, call it z, and the labor search
cost .
To foreclose this temptation, we should im-
pose the incentive compatibility constraint
E2  E1  0.
Combining this constraint with the stage 1 Bell-
man equation
37
rE1  z    qE2  E1,
and using equation (32), we conclude, not sur-
prisingly, that banks ration the credit they ex-
tend to ﬁrms:
z    rcp*.
What do we learn from all this? First, that the
strategic use of debt by bankers and entrepre-
neurs to expropriate workers is a real possibil-
ity: banks might indeed lend to ﬁrms more than
what is required to ﬁnance a job search. In that
respect, it is both remarkable and reassuring that
our stylized model of credit and labor market
imperfections, once extended to include an en-
dogenous wage, replicates the results of Perotti
and Spier (1993) on the strategic use of corpo-
rate debt. Second, that the possibility to expro-
priate workers never reduces them to their
reservation wage. We have indeed established
this would require so much debt that the ﬁrm
would lose any incentive to actually hire a
worker, start producing, and repay its bank.
Finally, that the strategic use of corporate debt,
while theoretically plausible, probably does not
amount to much in practice, as the difference
36 This reasoning of course presupposes either that the
entrepreneur has consumed right away the resources lent to
him by the ﬁnancier above and beyond what was needed to
search for a worker, or, if she has not, that he has protected
them to exclude them from the negotiation with the workers.
37 This Bellman equation is the generalization of equa-
tion (5) when the amount z lent by the ﬁnanciers differs
from the labor search cost .
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any sensible values of the parameters.
38
B. Endogenous Destruction
We have assumed until now rather rudimen-
tary production and destruction processes: out-
put y is constant, and destruction occurs
exogenously at rate s. Fortunately, our results
readily generalize to a richer stochastic environ-
ment that yields interesting insights into the
endogenous destruction of ﬁrms and their ﬁnan-
cial fragility.
Maintain, for simplicity, the assumption that
wages  are exogenous, but imagine that the
output of a ﬁrm is governed by the following
random process:
39
● When a ﬁrm starts producing in stage 2, its
initial output is y
0. All ﬁrms start with the
same y
0.
● With Poisson arrival rate   0, the output
of a ﬁrm then idiosyncratically jumps to
another level y, with y drawn randomly
from a distribution with cumulative distri-
bution G.
40
Destruction or Reﬁnancing?—If a ﬁrm were
operating in all states of nature until it gets
destroyed exogenously at rate s, computing the
present discount value of its output, net of
wages, would be as simple a matter as it was in
Section II. However, the ﬁrm does not operate,
when output is random, in all states of nature:
the ﬁnancier and the entrepreneur optimally
agree to dissolve their match, and close down
the ﬁrm, if, and as soon as, the total surplus of
the match between the bank and the ﬁrm be-
comes negative. Thus, there are two sources of
destruction of the ﬁrm. An exogenous source, at
rate s, that represents outside forces impinging
on the ﬁrm’s viability. Plus an endogenous
source, which we must still characterize for-
mally, that captures the optimal dissolution of
ﬁrms in “bad” states of nature.
41
The novelty introduced by stochastic changes
in productivity is that there are now states of
nature in which the ﬁrm operates in spite of
negative output net of wages (y    0).
These are states in which the ﬁnancier has com-
mitted to inject new liquidity in the ﬁrm—to
help it ride out of a temporary negative cash
ﬂow period—because the value of the match
between bank and ﬁrm is still positive. How-
ever, as we shall see below, some of these states
with positive total surplus are ﬁnancially frag-
ile, in the sense that the banker would neverthe-
less like ex post to close down the ﬁrm, but is
restrained by his prior commitment to keep it in
operation. We must therefore determine for
which values of y the ﬁrm is closed down, when
it is reﬁnanced, and when it is ﬁnancially
fragile.
Viability Cutoff Rule and Equilibrium.—The
value functions of banks and entrepreneurs
add up to the total surplus Si of their relation-
ship in stage i, with i  1, 2, 3. In stage 2
(which is crucial for destruction), the total
surplus S2(y) depends on the state of nature y,
and satisﬁes
(33) rS2y  y    sS3  S2y
 	maxS2y, S3  S2y dGy.
The relationship generates total ﬂow proﬁts y 
. The match is exogenously destroyed with
intensity s, generating a capital gain (or loss, if
negative) equal to S3  S2(y). In addition, with
intensity , output reaches a new level y, and
the match generates a capital gain which equals
max[S2(y), S3]  S2(y) since the match is
endogenously destroyed in states of nature in
which S2(y)  S3.
Assume, as in Section I, that the termination
of the relationship leads to the loss of the spec-
iﬁcity of the entrepreneur-banker relationship,
so that B3  B0 and E3  E0. Together with the
38 With p0  1,   0.5 and for the calibration param-
eters of footnote 30, rcp(*) is only equal to 0.8 percent of
the search cost —a negligible quantity. Assuming, as we
have done earlier, that z equals , is thus not a drastic
oversimpliﬁcation.
39 See Dale T. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
40 We can allow output to be negative if we think of y as
output net of operating costs other than wages or ﬁnancial
costs.
41 Destruction, whether exogenous or endogenous, is
thus always efﬁcient in our scenario.
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that S3  B3  E3  0. As a result, inspection
of equation (33) reveals that S2(y) is linear in y,




r  s   ,
with the cutoff point y
d solving the equation
S2(y)  0 or, from equation (33),
(34) y





This deﬁnes a viability rule: banker and entre-
preneur agree to keep the ﬁrm in operation for
values of y above y
d for which output is sufﬁ-
cient to generate a positive total surplus.
42 In
states where y  [yd, ), the bank injects ad-
ditional liquidity   y  0i nt h eﬁrm to keep
it alive.
43 As a result, the value of the ﬁrm in
stage 2, E2(y), is always positive, since the
entrepreneur receives (as long as the ﬁrm oper-
ates) additional liquidity in bad states of nature,
and makes positive ﬂow proﬁts in good states.
In their ﬁnancial negotiation in stage 1, ﬁn-
anciers and entrepreneurs agree on how to share
the total surplus of their relationship, given the
total surplus S2(y
0) that their relationship will
generate at the very beginning of stage 2.
Hence, the equations of the BB and EE curves
of the economy with endogenous destruction
are the same as in the economy with exogenous
destruction [equations (15) and (16)], but with
S2(y
0) replacing the term (y  )/(r  s). The
intersection of these modiﬁed BB and EE
curves determines equilibrium credit market
tightness—which remains, as before, equal to
*  [(1  	)/	](k/c)—and equilibrium labor
market tightness *. The latter depends on the
initial proﬁtability y
0 of ﬁrms, and on the re-
strictiveness of the viability cutoff rule y
d. The
larger y
0 or the smaller y
d, the larger * and the
lower equilibrium unemployment.
Financial Fragility.—We now show that a
salient feature of the equilibrium with endoge-
nous destruction we have just described is that
the ﬁnancier would like ex post to renege on his
commitment to reﬁnance the ﬁrm in states of
nature y  [y
d, )i fy ends up at the bottom of
that range.
Consider the stage 2 Bellman equation of the
bank in states of nature where y  :








B2y  B2y dGy.
The bank injects   y in the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm is
destroyed with exogenous intensity s. With in-
tensity , output changes to a new level y.I fy
is below y
d, the ﬁrm is closed down and the
bank is left with B3. Otherwise, it makes a
capital gain B2(y)  B2(y).
With our assumption that B3  B0 and free
entry, equation (35) implies that B2  0 when
y   if, in addition,
(36) y 
   	
yd
	
B2y dGy  y
B.
Now, comparing this expression with equation










E2y dGy  0.
The inequality follows from the remark above that
the value of the ﬁrm in stage 2, E2(y), is positive
in all states of nature, even when y  .
44
This means that some of the states of nature
42 If y
0  y
d, the economy is not viable ex ante: ﬁrms do
not get the funds required to proceed to the recruiting stage,
and no output is ever produced. We henceforth rule out that
case.
43 This feature is already present in Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994), but it is irrelevant in their perfect capital
market setup.
44 Note that this result does not depend on the shape of
the ﬁnancial contract.
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the ﬁrm because the total surplus is positive
(y  y
d) can also be states in which the value of
the bank is negative (y  y
B). Were it not for its
prior commitment not to do so when y  y
d, the
bank would therefore prefer ex post to sever its
relationship with the ﬁrm when y  y
B.
45
In these states, ﬁrms are ﬁnancially fragile, as
their survival hangs solely on the strength of the
bank’s prior commitments (or on its reputa-
tion).
46 Any weakening of these commitments
would entail the destruction of some, or all, of
these ﬁnancially fragile ﬁrms.
V. Conclusion
This paper has built a simple macroeconomic
model of credit and labor market imperfections
based on matching frictions. Its main feature is
the derivation of a ﬁnancial accelerator that
results from the general-equilibrium feedback
between credit and labor markets.
Our paper leaves open a number of questions,
both theoretical and empirical. First, what
would happen if liquidity not only meant will-
ingness to lend, but also existence of sufﬁcient
ﬁnancial resources to ﬁnance economic activ-
ity? Second, can we build upon our model to
generate a theory of growth and business cy-
cles? Finally, what empirical evidence could be
adduced to back up our claim that the combi-
nation of moderate credit frictions and moderate
labor frictions is enough to explain high
unemployment?
Answering the ﬁrst question would require
us to close our model differently (liquidity
would need to assume a more traditional
meaning of ﬁnancial “water”ﬂ owing in and
out of the economy). Doing so, although no
simple matter, would enable us to study
whether the economy generates enough li-
quidity in the face of shocks to ﬁnance itself
without outside intervention,
47 and would
generate a mechanism for the propagation and
transmission of shocks over time.
Second, endogenous growth could be intro-
duced in our model by assuming that new en-
trepreneurs, instead of using an existing
technology, are the engine of technological in-
novation. Accordingly, ﬁnance would become
an essential input into long-run growth.
Finally, the search for additional cross-
sectional empirical evidence on credit frictions
ﬁgures prominently on our research agenda.
48
Most importantly, we would like to understand
further the contribution of differences in the
ﬂuidity of regional credit markets to the some-
times persistently divergent unemployment ex-
periences of areas that share, within the same
country, identical labor market institutions. This
might ultimately help to understand why dereg-
ulation of labor markets at the margin has not
produced in Europe its expected effects on
employment.
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